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DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.: THE MEANING
OF "UNREASONABLE DANGER" IN LOUISIANA
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The plaintiff contracted serum hepatitis following a blood transfu-
sion she received in conjunction with surgery performed at Southern
Baptist Hospital, and sued both the hospital and its blood bank, which
had drawn and processed the blood. The district court dismissed the
suit, finding no cause of action on an implied warranty in connection
with the sale of blood, and no proof of negligence in the blood's
preparation, storage, or infusion.' The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the dismissal based on its finding that the plaintiff failed
to prove either that the blood was unwholesome or that it caused
the plaintiff's disease." The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and
entered judgment for the plaintiff. Although the supreme court af-
firmed the district court's finding of no negligence on the part of the
hospital, it found the defendants strictly liable in tort, holding that
blood contaminated with hepatitis virus is defective, i.e., unreasonably
dangerous to normal use. Additionally, the supreme court determined
that "[tihe risks involved in receiving a transfusion of blood in this
condition are certainly greater than a reasonable consumer would ex-
pect." DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co., 403 So. 2d 26,
31 (La. 1981).
Products liability, a recent development of tort law, encompasses
that class of cases involving the liability of the seller of a product
for injury caused by defects in that product. Traditionally, individuals
who were injured by manufactured products looked to the theories
of negligence and implied warranties for their causes of action.
However, neither theory was totally responsive to the needs of all
plaintiffs.' The action on the breach of an implied warranty sounded
in contract and required privity between the injured party and the
party being sued. When the injured party was merely a user of the
1. See DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26. 26 (La. 1981).
2. DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1980).
3. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d
185 (1966); DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46 Ohio App. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ct. Com.
Pleas 1951); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to War-
ranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980):
Clearly, traditional negligence and warranty causes of action posed serious
impediments to the injured consumer's ability to recover. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the public policy goals undergirding the societal commitment to a notion
of expansive manufacturer liability for defective products could not be effectively
realized in view of the limitations inherent in the traditional causes of action.
See also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Note, Torts-
Strict Liability of Manufacturers. 23 LA. L. REV. 810 (1963); 63 AM. Jun. 2d Products
Liability S 25 (1972); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 672, 674 (1922).
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product, separated from the manufacturer by middlemen and the pur-
chaser, he was unable to bring a warranty action.4 However, the alter-
native action brought in negligence presented an equally formidable
problem -the plaintiff had the burden of proving some act on the part
of the manufacturer that fell below the standard of care owed the
plaintiff.' Although the courts found ways to circumvent these prob-
lems, their methods were largely unsatisfactory, if only from a
theoretical standpoint!
4. See, e.g., Catlin v. Union Oil Co., 31 Cal. App. 597, 161 P. 29 (1916); Kusiek
v. Thorndike & Hix, 224 Mass. 413, 112 N.E. 1025 (1916); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler
Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss.
490, 78 So. 365 (1918); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913); Birn-
baum, supra note 3; Krauskopf, Products Liability, 32 Mo. L. REV. 459, 462 (1967): "The
ultimate manufacturer was ordinarily the one best able to satisfy a judgment, but
without privity between the injured party and the manufacturer supporting an action
sounding in contract was impossible."
5. See, e.g., Evans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968);
Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 595-96:
[A] cause of action in negligence did not suddenly become a route without burdens
.... The injured plaintiff still had the considerable evidentiary problem of prov-
ing that the manufacturer was, in fact, negligent. The doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur, where applicable, offered some help, but the manufacturer could dispel
the inference of negligence by advancing sufficient evidence to show that he ex-
ercised due care in the manufacture of the product and in the adoption of quality
control measures. As Justice Traynor'noted, 'faln injured person, however, is not
ordinarily in a position to refute s uch evidence or identify the cause of the defect,
for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufac-
turer himself is.'
Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675,
676 (1963): "The principle obstacle to recovery, generally speaking, on a negligence
theory is not the substantive law as to duty or causation but the unavailability of
sufficient evidence of negligence to have the case submitted to the jury."; Krauskopf,
supra note 4, at 459: "The obvious shortcoming of the negligence theory is the dif-
ficulty of proving lack of ordinary care. Negligence existing at the manufacturing level
may be impossible to establish even with the aid of res ipsa loquitur."; Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973):
It is often difficult, or even impossible, to prove negligence on the part of the
manufacturer or supplier. True, res ipsa loquitur often comes to the aid of the
injured party. But it is normally regarded as a form of circumstantial evidence,
and this means that there must be a logical inference of negligence which is suffi-
ciently strong to let the case go to the jury. This is often not present, and strict
liability eliminates the need of the proof.
6. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Madouras
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App.
1936); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928); Wisdom
v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929); Birnbaum, supra note 3,
at 594 [speaking of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)]:
"Linking the duty of due care to the contract doctrine of privity made the respon-
sibility of the manufacturer to the user of the product essentially illusory." Also, id.
at 595: "[In the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. [32 N.J. 358.
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In 1963 the California Supreme Court proposed a new theory of
recovery in products liability cases with its decision in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,7 which is generally regarded8 as the foun-
tainhead of strict liability in a products liability action. In Greenman,
the state supreme court established that the manufacturer's liability
for his defective products could be grounded in strict tort liability
without resort to theories of negligence or breach of implied warranty.
The court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."'
In response to the rapid developments in products liability law
evidenced by and following Greenman, the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in 1965 addressed the liability of "[one who sells
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer .... "1 According to the comments to section 402(A),
161 A.2d 69 (1960)], the New Jersey Supreme Court dispensed with the privity re-
quirement . . . holding that the obligation of the manufacturer is not grounded in
the law of sales, but upon the 'demands of social justice.' "; Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099. 1100 (1960): "The most
important of these [exceptions to the general rule of non-liability to persons not in
privity] was that the seller of a chattel owed to any one who might be expected to
use it a duty of reasonable care to make it safe .... ."; Wade, supra note 3, at 6:
[Miany courts have permitted a warranty action by the ultimate purchaser against
the manufacturer by stretching various legal concepts out of shape in order to
find privity present. Thus, they sometimes have treated the retailer as an agent
of either the manufacturer or the purchaser; or they have spoken of assignment
of the interest; they have treated the purchaser as a third party beneficiary of
another contract. More frequently, they have spoken of the warranty as running
with the chattel, much as a covenant runs with the land.
7. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1981): Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980); Murray
v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979); McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra,
598 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design
Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., 561 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1977); Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753
(S.D. Miss. 1977). See generally, Crawford, Products Liability-The Cause of Action, 22
LA. B.J. 239 (1975); Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5,9 (1965); Comment, Manufacturer's
Product Liability-Strict Liability-Tort or Contact?, 43 B.U.L. REV. 576 (1963); Note,
Torts-Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 23 LA. L. REV. 810 (1964); Note, Torts-Products
Liability-Strict Liability? 28 Mo. L. REv. 663 (1963).
9. 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
19821 1455
1456 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
the seller incurs liability when the product leaves his hands in a con-
dition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer "which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him."'" The phrase "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" is defined in the comment to mean that the
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by "the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."'"
Just as Greenman and the Restatement are the predominant
American common law authorities in the products liability field, so
must Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.'" be considered the
cornerstone of Louisiana products liability law." In Weber the plain-
tiff's sons had sprayed an arsenic-based cattle dip manufactured by
defendant's insured on their cattle, resulting in the death of some
of the cattle and mild illness of the boys. The plaintiffs' uncon'troverted
testimony that the dip was mixed properly with water and that all
other instructions were followed was accepted by the court as ex-
cluding all other reasonable hypotheses for the cattle deaths except
that the dip, as manufactured, must have contained too much arsenic.'
In view of this finding, the supreme court stated that the district
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
11. Id. comment (g).
12. Id. comment (i).
13. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
14. See Phillipe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981); Thornhill v. Black,
Sivalls, & Bryson, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So.
2d 585 (La. 1980); LoBrono v. Gene Ducote Volkswagen, Inc., 391 So. 2d 1360 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
394 So. 2d 615 (La. 1980); Perkins v. American Mach. & Foundary Co., 385 So. 2d
492 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 727 (La. 1980); Western Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Adams, 381 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Maytag
Co., 374 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Harris v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1979); Walter v. Valley, 363 So. 2d 1266 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Ashley
v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 321 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,.32,I
So. 2d 478 (La. 1975); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cinnater, 305 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Crawford, Products Liability-The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239 (1975). See
generally Crawford, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term--
Torts, 40 LA. L. REV. 564 (1980); Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability,
40 LA. L. REv. 403 (1980).
15. 259 La. at 608-09, 250 So. 2d at 757-58.
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and appellate courts had correctly found applicable the following legal
principles:
A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to
the user is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a third
person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury caused
by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of the arti-
cle, if the injury might reasonably have been anticipated. However,
the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden of proving that the prod-
uct was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and
that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by reason of the defect."6
The supreme court further held that
[ijf the product is proven defective by reason of its hazard
to normal use, the plaintiff need not prove any particular
negligence by the maker in its manufacture or processing; for the
manufacturer is presumed to know of the vices in the things he
makes, whether or not he has actual knowledge of them."
These two oft-quoted segments of then Justice Tate's opinion have
formed the basis of the Louisiana products liability action.'8
Subsequent Louisiana decisions have determined that the above
quoted statements define a defective product-one "unreasonably
dangerous to normal use"-and impute knowledge of the defect to
the manufacturer, relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving a
sub-standard act on the part of the defendant manufacturer. However,
the standards for determining "unreasonable danger" remain unclear.
Less than one year before DeBattista, the supreme court addressed
the issues relevant to determining the Weber "unreasonable danger"
in Hunt v. City Stores, Inc." In Hunt the court acknowledged that
16. 259 La. at 602-03, 250 So. 2d at 755 (emphasis added).
17. 259 La. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 746.
18. All delictual liability in Louisiana arises from Civil Code articles 2315-2324.
Fault in Louisiana products liability cases is treated as delictual, but the Supreme
Court has never expressly established articles 2315-2324 as the bases for the products
liability action. See, e.g., Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331
(La. 1978); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971); Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d 816
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978); Leonard v. Albany Mach. & Supply Co.. 339 So. 2d 458 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 419 (La. 1977); Dixon v. Gutnecht, 339 So. 2d
1285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 673 (La. 1977); Amco Under-
writers of Audubon Ins. Co. v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 329 So. 2d 501
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
19. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980). The plaintiffs in Hunt brought suit against the defen-
dant escalator manufacturer and others to recover for injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff's minor son when his shoe became caught between the escalator's moving tread
and side wall. Though the Hunt analysis arose in the context of Civil Code article
1457
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"unreasonableness" was traditionally a standard by which to deter..
mine negligence, but also called it "fundamental to a finding of strict
liability .... In both negligence and strict liability cases, the prob..
ability and magnitude of the risk are to be balanced against the utili..
ty of the thing." The court cited Weber and its definition of defect,
saying that "[tlhe focus is on the product itself and whether it is
unreasonably dangerous to normal use,"I and held that "[wihile the
[product] was beneficial and convenient to [the defendant department
store], the utility of its condition .. .was outweighed by the hazard
to [this class of plaintiffs]."'
Hunt does not stand alone as recognizing a utility/risk balancing
test' in determining an unreasonable danger. Louisiana appellate
2317 concerning the liability of a custodian of a defective thing, it is still relevant
to determination of fault in a products liability action, which is delictual in nature.
This relevancy is evident in that Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), in which
the supreme court articulated the strict liability aspect of article 2317, was cited in
the strict liability discussion in Hunt as the controlling interpretation of article 2317.
In DeBattista, the court equated the standards set out in Loescher and Weber as "similar"
rules of strict liability. 403 So. 2d at 30. Logically, then, if Civil Code articles 2315-2324
are the sole bases of delictual fault in Louisiana, the analysis of strict liability in Hunt
is relevant to a treatment of strict liability in a products liability case.
20. 387 So. 2d at 589.
21. Id. at 588.
22. Recognized authorities have discussed this balancing test approach, which in-
volves weighing several factors relating to both the product and the societal ramifica-
tions of a given judgment. Professor Wade has advanced a list of factors in his writings
including
1) the usefulness of the product,
2) the likelihood and probable seriousness of injury from the product,
3) the availability of a safer substitute,
4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing
the product's usefulness,
5) the user's ability to avoid the danger through use of due care,
6) the common knowledge and expectations as to the danger the product presents,
7) the feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss through
increased prices.
He contends that the determination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous
necessarily involves the use of a standard similar to that used in negligence, and that
the standard must be the product of a weighing of factors. Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,837 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965). Dean Page Keeton of the University of Texas
School of Law writes that a product
is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the
magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time
of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and
marketed. Under the heading of benefits one would include anything that gives
utility of some kind to the product; one would also include the infeasibility and
additional cost of making a safer product.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973).
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courts have applied a balancing test in previous transfusion/hepatitis
cases. In Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank Inc.8 Judge Bertrand
methodically considered the many bases the plaintiff presented for
the defendants' liability. Regarding the plaintiffs strict liability argu-
ment based on Weber, the court noted that, "[t~he question must
become what is 'unreasonably dangerous.'" It refused to find, as the
plaintiff contended, that the fact that the plaintiff had contracted
hepatitis made the blood "unreasonably dangerous," but stated that
"[rleasonableness must be determined in light of the need for blood
transfusions compared to the likelihood of contracting hepatitis from
the transfusions. '*
In Martin v. Southern Baptist Hospital5 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal denied the plaintiffs' recovery by finding that the legislature
in Louisiana Civil Code article 1764(B)"-dealing with implied war-
ranties of merchantability -had already performed its own weighing
of factors relevant to determination of liability for blood, and had
classified blood as a "medical service," exempting it from the product
warranties, because "public policy.., recognizes the life-saving need
for use of blood, vital in some cases. While the danger of contracting
See also Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 359
(1974); Note, Nichols v. Union Underwear Co. and the Meaning of "Unreasonably
Dangerous," 69 Ky. L.J. 419, 430-31 (1980).
23. 333 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 337 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976). The
relevant facts of Juneau are substantially the same as those of DeBattista.
24. Id. at 358.
25. 352 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). writ denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978).
The relevant facts of Martin are substantially the same as those of DeBattista.
26. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1764 provides, in pertinent part:
[Tlhe implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable
to a contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue
or organs from a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs. Such
blood, blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for the purposes of this Article
be considered commodities subject to sale or barter but shall be considered as
medical services.
In DeBattista, the supreme court accused the courts of appeal of "disregarding the
positive codal provisions under the pretext of pursuing their spirit" in applying Civil
Code article 1764 to remove blood from the realm of products liability. 403 So. 2d
at 33. Actually, the appellate courts seem to espouse the preferable theory. The
legislative amendment of article 1764 classifying blood as a service and removing the
actions based on implied warranties of merchantability and fitness was passed in 1968,
before Weber and strict liability for products were part of Louisiana law. That amend-
ment appears to have been an attempt to negate all causes of action that could arise
concerning contaminated blood except the action in negligence. It is not an unreasonable
interpretation of legislative intent for the appellate courts to assume that if strict
liability had been available in 1968, the same policy reasons which compelled the
legislature to remove all actions but negligence also would have led to the elimination
of the strict liability action for blood.
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hepatitis exists in blood transfusions, medical science ...[has] not
progressed to the point where effective, foolproof tests [have] been
-perfected to discern the presence of hepatitis."" Although the Mar-
tin decision did not turn on the application or interpretation of strict
liability doctrine, it does represent appellate court recognition of util-
ity/risk balancing (in this case by the legislature) in determining the
existence of a defect.
It is apparent, therefore, that the state of the law in Louisiana
at the time of the DeBattista decision was that the jurisprudence had
defined a defect in terms of unreasonable danger, and that both the
supreme court in Hunt and the appellate courts in the leading Loui-
siana transfusion/hepatitis decisions called for a balancing of the ob-
ject's utility and its risks to determine "defect" or "unreasonable
danger" in strict liability cases.
A cursory reading of the DeBattista opinion reveals that it is
couched in the terminology of Weber. However, its actual effect is
to change the Louisiana law of products liability established in that
case. In DeBattista, the Louisiana Supreme Court to a large extent
tracks a 1972 California Supreme Court opinion, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.,28 in fashioning a consumer-oriented test for defectiveness. A
simultaneous reading of Cronin and DeBattista reveals similar
organization and phraseology, though some important distinctions can
be drawn.
The Cronin court analyzed the effect that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts had had upon its decision made nine years earlier in
Greenman and concluded that the presence of the Restatement ter-
minology concerning "unreasonable danger" in California products
liability law imposed a greater burden on plaintiff than that intended
in Greenman, in that use of that language seemed a reversion to
negligence as the basis for recovery. In an effort to clarify California
law and maintain Greenman's eased burden of proof for plaintiff, the
Cronin court held that the plaintiff in any California products liabil-
ity case need prove only defect, and not that the "defect" was
"unreasonably dangerous," or that the product fell below the expec-
tations of the "ordinary consumer.""9 The only suggestion the court
27. 352 So. 2d at 354.
28. 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972). The Cronin case involved a products
liability action brought by the driver of an assembled bread truck against the sales
agent for the trucks. The driver sustained injuries when an aluminum safety hasp
failed in a collision, allowing the bread racks to slide forward into the drivers com-
partment and strike the driver. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the California
Superior Court, and was affirmed by the state supreme court.
29. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 501 P.2d at 1162: "We think that a requirement that
a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places
upon him a significantly increased burden and represents a step backward in the area
1460 [Vol. 42
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provided for determination of the existence of a defect was reference
to the "cluster of useful precedents" mentioned in a footnote to the
opinion.'
Unlike the California court in Cronin, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in DeBattista elected to retain the requirement of an
"unreasonable" risk as a condition to strict liability, stating that it
is to be "carefully applied ...with its true purpose in mind."3 In
order to implement a consumer-oriented approach inLouisiana prod-
ucts liability law, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the product
was "defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use. The risks
involved in receiving a transfusion of blood in this condition are cer-
tainly greater than a reasonable consumer would expect."3
pioneered by this court." The California Supreme Court recognized that use of the
words "unreasonably dangerous" may prevent the seller from becoming an insurer
of its products, but still rejected that phrase, reasoning that the same "protective
end is attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture
or design of the product." 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 501 P.2d at 1162.
The Cronin court also expressly refused to differentiate between design defects
and manufacturing defects. A defect in design may be generally defined as a defect
(however that concept is defined) in a product that is manufactured precisely in ac-
cord with its designer's specifications. A manufacturing defect, on the other hand, is
the result of a miscarriage in the manufacturing process which produces a result
unintended by the product's designers. See generally Wade, supra note 5. and Fischer,
supra note 22. The Cronin court saw such differentiation as a potential "battleground
for clever counsel," and decided that "a distinction between manufacture and design
defects is not tenable." 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443, 501 P.2d at 1163.
30. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16: "We recognize, of course,
the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness standard. However, as
Justice Traynor notes. 'there is now a cluster of useful precedents to supersede the
confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales and warranty laws.'"
At least one commentator, writing in 1973 immediately after the Cronin decision was
rendered, correctly predicted that despite the "cluster of useful precedents," the Cronin
decision was merely a rejection of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard which
substituted "nothing in the place of that notion to give content to the term defective."
Keeton, supra note 22, at 33. Keeton also correctly predicted the resultant confusion
that Cronin would engender:
It is submitted, contrary to what is asserted by the Supreme Court of California,
that lawyers in trying to settle cases, and trial judges, juries and appellate courts
in fulfilling their respective roles in the litigation process will experience great
difficulty until some content can be given to the concept defective in those situa-
tions where it is alleged that the product as designed and marketed was defective.
Id. at 32.
31. 403 So. 2d. at 31. The only further explanation given by the opinion as to
what this "true purpose" might be is the statement that "the words 'unreasonably
dangerous' may serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the manufacturer from be-
ing treated as the insurer of its products." Id. However, this language merely is quoted
from the Cronin opinion, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 501 P.2d at 1162; no insight is provided
as to how the phrase may be used to accomplish the stated end.
32. 403 So. 2d at 31.
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Although DeBattista does not attempt to strip the word "defect"
of all jurisprudential gloss, as the Cronin court did, the Louisiana
Supreme Court does tread where the California court did not dare.
After acknowledging Civil Code article 2315 and Weber as the bases
for products liability fault in Louisiana,' the opinion discounts the
defendant's argument that the utility of the instant product and the
burden of preventing its alleged defect greatly outweigh the risk of
harm it poses. The court specifically dismisses this balancing argu-
ment as a "misconstru[ction]" of the unreasonably dangerous limita-
tion, stating that "'[ulnreasonably dangerous' means simply that the
article which injured the plaintiff was dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by an ordinary consumer. '"' The
court expressly"5 refused to consider the balancing argument as a
defense under the Weber "defect, i.e., unreasonably dangerous" stan-
dard, and it impliedly rejected utility/risk balancing as a defense under
the DeBattista "reasonable consumer expectation" standard by not
recognizing the argument and disposing of it in light of the new stan-
dard. A fortiori, if a balancing argument is not available as a defense,
it should also be unavailable to carry plaintiffs burden under the new
"reasonable consumer expectation" test of defectiveness. To construe
the court's words otherwise would have the absurd result that the
plaintiff would be able to carry successfully his preponderance of the
evidence burden with only the smallest showing that the product's
risks outweigh its utility, because the defendant would be precluded
(via DeBattista) from asserting any balancing argument. Therefore,
one justifiably could read the DeBattista decision to hold that balanc-
ing the utility of the product and the risk it presents has no place
in a Louisiana products liability action.
The court's refusal to entertain defendant's balancing argument
may leave both the plaintiff and the defendant unable to litigate the
issue of defect (regardless of the standard) on the basis of the prod-
uct's values weighed against its potential harm. Such a reading of
DeBattista may cause problems for Louisiana courts in determining
the existence of product defects. Since the DeBattista opinion is so
33. 403 So. 2d at 29-30. This is the first instance of the supreme court tying together
article 2315 and products liability fault. See note 18, supra.
34. 403 So. 2d at 30. This is the language of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
See discussion in text at notes 10-12, supra.
The DeBattista court stated its consumer-oriented standard in terms of both the
"ordinary" consumer's expectations and those of the "reasonable" consumer. Presumably,
this distinction is not a significant one; the court surely would concede that the or-
dinary consumer and the reasonable consumer are practically one and the same.
35. Id. The express refusal consisted of labeling the defendant's arguments as
a misconstruction of "unreasonably dangerous."
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similar to that of Cronin, examination of the California post-Cronin
products liability decisions should provide an indication of the types
of problems Louisiana courts can expect to face.
The decisions of the California appellate courts after Cronin
demonstrate the usefulness of the balancing test approach in deter-
mining design defects in products liability cases. The Cronin court
had rejected "unreasonably dangerous" because of its disapproval of
that phrase's connotations of the negligence balancing test,"6 but the
subsequent California decisions evaded the spirit of the Cronin holding
and continued to apply balancing factors when determining the ex-
istence of a defect.
In Self v. General Motors Corp.," the California appellate court
simply renamed the former "unreasonably dangerous" concept, stating
that "while defective design is an amorphous and elusive concept ...
its contours certainly include the notion of excessive preventable
danger." The court went on to acquiesce in the jury's consideration
of traditional balancing factors in determining defectiveness:
When an automobile's fuel tank has been located in a position
relatively more hazardous than [other possible positions], when
the added hazard of its location has been recognized by the in-
dustry, when the danger is well-known to the designers, and when
the tank could have been readily relocated in a safer position, a
jury could conclude that the location of the fuel tank made. the
design of the automobile defective."
In Self, the jury was allowed to weigh those factors relating to the
reasonableness of the existing design to determine if it entailed "ex-
cessive preventable danger." This approach is merely the court's way
of retaining the "unreasonably dangerous" balancing test (contra
Cronin) without retaining the words "unreasonably dangerous."
The California appellate court was more direct in its disregard
for the Cronin pronouncements in Buccery v. General Motors Corp.10
36. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42, 501 P.2d at 1161-62: "The result of the [unreasonably
dangerous] limitation . . . has not been merely to prevent the seller from becoming
an insurer of his products .... Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with
proof of an element which rings of negligence."
37. 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974). In Self, the plain-
tiffs car was struck by another, causing the plaintiff's gas tank to explode. He alleged
defect in design in his suit against the manufacturer, claiming that the tank should
have been located inside of protective crossbars in the car's frame, instead of being
near a rear fender, protected only by a few sheets of metal.
38. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (emphasis added).
39. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
40. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The plaintiff
was injured when his truck was struck from behind and his head snapped back, strik-
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In that case, the trial court had improperly granted the defendant's
motion for non-suit on other grounds. The appellate court reversed
and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had introduced sufficient
evidence of defect' and stated that "[slince the decision of our Supreme
Court in Cronin . . .there has been considerable uncertainty as to
the definition of a defective product." 2 The court quoted extensively
from the Self opinion and cited other decisions dealing with design
defects, concluding that
[t]he foregoing authorities give us no comprehensive definition of
a defective product or defective design. What they do teach,
however, is that any product so designed that it causes injury
when used or misused in a foreseeable fashion is defective if the
design feature which caused the injury created a danger which
was readily preventable through the employment of existing
technology at a cost consonant with the economical use of the
product.'3
Both Self and Buccery are representative of the attitude adopted
by California appellate courts after Cronin."' At least in the area of
ing the window of the cab. He alleged that the. absence of head restraints constituted
a design defect.
41. The evidence referred to consisted of expert testimony to the effect that head
restraints were an accepted safety device in the industry, that installation of head
restraints presented no technical problems, and that the resulting increase in the cost
of the car would be negligible. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
42. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 543-44, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
43. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
44. See also Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1976). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that his injuries were aggravated
by the defective design of the headlight molding of an automobile which struck him.
Judgment was rendered for the defendant manufacturer and the plaintiff appealed,
challenging the action of the trial court in defining "defect" in its jury instructions.
In essence, the definition stated that a defect in design was a design that caused in-
jury, given the finding of the existence of an alternative feasible design that would
not have caused the injury. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 748. The ap-
pellate court upheld the trial court's judgment for defendant (and, thus, the trial court's
definition), citing Self, and held that
the reasonableness of an alternative design-whether the design can actually be
produced, the materials for production are available, the costs are not prohibitive,
etc.-is a factor to be considered in determining whether the design which was
actually used can be characterized as defective .... An injured plaintiff has always
had the burden to prove the existence of the defect. The reasonableness of alter-
native designs, where a design defect is claimed, is part of that burden.
55 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 749. In Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 769,
111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the plaintiff successfully sued a homebuilder
for his defective design of a garage. The plaintiff's injury occurred when he was burned
by overturned gasoline which was ignited by a defectively placed water heater. In
overturning the lower court's non-suit of the plaintiff, the appellate court stated that
It]he determination of whether the [alleged defect) constituted a defective design,
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design defects, the courts refused to accept the ambiguity of the
Cronin standard, and chose to rely upon a weighing of the utility of
the product in its allegedly "defective" condition against the magnitude
of the risk if presented to consumers. As the cases demonstrate, this
approach was not mere mutiny on behalf of the intermediate tribunal,
but a well-reasoned adherence to the accepted method of determin-
ing a defect in light of various policy factors.
The post-Cronin undercurrent of revolt in. California products
liability culminated with the California Supreme Court once again tak-
ing up the issue of "defect" in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc."
The court purported to explain Cronin, yet, being six years older and
many appellate decisions wiser, actually revised the standard pre-
viously taken in that case. In short, it was forced to recognize the
confusion that it had caused by leaving defect undefined, especially
in design defect cases..
The supreme court pinpointed the weakness of Cronin when it
observed that resort to the numerous California precedents revealed
a great variety of "injury producing deficiencies" (i.e., defects)."1
Though, in Cronin, it had recommended that "the problem in defin-
ing defect might be alleviated by reference to the 'cluster of useful
precedents,""' the court realized that appellate decisions since Cronin
had "wrestled" with the problem of defect, particularly in the con-
text of design defects. It cited Self, Buccery," and other decisions as
examples, and admitted that "the concept of defect raises considerably
more difficulties in the design defect context than it does in the
manufacturing or production defect context."" To remedy the situa-
tion, the Barker court retreated from Cronin's homogeneous treat-
ment of all defects, and bifurcated the standard in California. Barker
held that the Cronin standard of simple "defect" was still intact as
plaintiff's burden in manufacturing defect cases, but declared that in
design defect cases it would be proper for the court to consider either
the ordinary consumer's expectations or "that on balance the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger in such design."'
and the foreseeability of harm resulting therefrom, should have been left to the
jury. It was for the jury to balance the likelihood of harm and the gravity of
the harm as opposed to the burden of precautions which would effectively have
avoided it.
35 Cal. App. at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
45. 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
46. 143 Cal. Rptr. 235, 573 P.2d at 453.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court also cited Hyman and Baker. See note 43, supra, and accompa-
nying text.
49. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36, 573 P.2d at 453-54.
50. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234, 573 P.2d at 452. The court expressly yielded to the
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The solution in Barker tends to suggest two steps toward clarify-
ing products liability law which were not taken by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in DeBattista. The first step is to recognize that not
all products may be treated alike in determining what condition of
the product constitutes a defect. The range of possible products, possi-
ble defects, and important social policy considerations which need be
heeded are simply too complex to allow a single, all-purpose, com-
prehensive definition of defect. 1 The second step is to realize that
a balancing test approach is vital in determining design defects. It
is submitted that the major problem with the DeBattista decision is
that it does not draw these distinctions.
In DeBattista, the court evidently is issuing a warning to sup-
pliers and processors of blood that they are to be ultimately respon-
sible for the harm done to their patients who contract hepatitis. Its
decision is no doubt motivated by weighty and troublesome considera-
tions of social policy regarding blood transfusions, upon which this
note does not express an opinion, other than to submit that the result,
and the holding of DeBattista, are (arguably)" acceptable in a transfu-
sion/hepatitis case. However, by not limiting the pronouncement of
DeBattista to cases involving blood transfusions, the court has allowed
parties to present arguments using DeBattista as precedent in pro-
ducts liability cases involving "shampoos, deodorants, candy bars,
toasters, automobiles, oil changes and other everyday commodities.
."" The social policy considerations which served as a source of
appellate court's use of a utility/risk balancing test, stating :that
a jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the, gravity of the danger
posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the
mechanical feasibility of safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design.
143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455. It should be noted that the holding of the
Barker court went even further and shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiff
to the defendant. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455. The plaintiff's showing of
proximate cause between his injury and the product's design will now shift to the
defendant the burden of proving that the design was not defective "in light of the
relevant factors." 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455. Analysis of this facet of the
Barker opinion is beyond the scope of this paper.
51. See Fisher, supra note 22, at 358:
IDlevising one test of defectiveness to be applied uniformly to all products
makes strict liability a very crude instrument of social policy .... IT]he policies
underlying strict liability can be frustrated in cases where countervailing con-
siderations do not warrant its rejection. Likewise, strict liability can be imposed
in unwarranted situations despite strong countervailing policies.
52. The Louisiana Legislature has acted to remove strict liability for blood transfu-
sions. See 1981 La. Acts, No. 331, adding LA. R.S. 9:2797; 1981 La. Acts, No. 611, add-
ing LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2322.1.
53. 403 So. 2d at 34 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
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motivation for the DeBattista decision are not present for these other
products, and the use of a supreme court decision pregnant with these
considerations is inappropriate in cases involving more mundane pro-
ducts. It is submitted, therefore, that the law fashioned in DeBattista
should be restricted to blood transfusion cases, or possibly cases in-
volving products with policy considerations similar to those for blood,
such as drugs, vaccines, etc.
The second requirement for a healthy products liability law scheme
suggested by the California Supreme Court in Barker is acknowledg-
ment of the necessity of a balancing test approach in determining
design defects. As it now stands, the DeBattista court's seemingly
wholesale preclusion of the balancing approach to determining
"unreasonableness" would preclude its use in design defect cases. A.
comprehensive statement concerning design defects and the tests used
to determine such defects would help clarify products liability law
in Louisiana. Drawing the distinction made in Barker also would allow
Louisiana courts to restrict the application of DeBattista to appropriate
factual situations, and retain the balancing approach of Hunt to deter-
mine design defects.
If any lesson is to be drawn from the California Cronin/Barker
experience, it is that consideration of a product's utility, the magnitude
of the risk it presents, and the burden of preventing that risk without
impairing its utility (when possible) are all valuable factors in deter-
mining the existence of a defective product design. The Louisiana
Supreme Court already has said as much, stating in Langlois v. Allied
Chemical Corp.:
The activities of man for which he may be liable without acting
negligently are to be determined after a study of the law and
customs, a balancing of claims and interests, a weighing of the
risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual
and societal rights and obligations."
Taking the suggested steps could clarify Louisiana products liability
law, and resolve the inconsistency of the Hunt and DeBattista opin-
ions while preserving their integrity.
William J. Sharp
54. 258 La. at 1084, 249 So. 2d at 140.
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